The Great Lisbon Earthquake, which took place on the morning of All Saints' Day in 1755, destroyed the vast majority of buildings in this imperial capital and its surrounding regions. Triggering a tsunami and a bout of untamable fires, the earthquake, estimated to have been in the range of 8.5-9.0 M, caused a death toll estimated to be as high as 100,000 people, thus making it one of the deadliest seismic events in recorded history. Among the many buildings destroyed in Lisbon was the massive Carmo Convent, a fourteenth-century gothic edifice built in the aftermath of a Portuguese victory against invading Castilian forces. Unlike other structures in the post-earthquake period, however, Carmo's main nave was never rebuilt -in part because of financial considerations and a Romantic-era aesthetic appreciation of medieval ruins, but also because it served as a reminder to lisboetas of the catastrophic destruction wrought by the tremor. Over two hundred years later, history once again reverberated from this locale during Portugal's leftist Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974, as the convent complex housed the final stronghold of Marcelo Caetano, the last head of the authoritarian Estado Novo regime, and the security personnel who remained loyal to him.
The ruins of the Carmo Convent, which sit atop a hill near Lisbon's downtown, now overlook the shopping and tourism districts of Chiado and Baixa. From this elevated vantage point, one can observe today the aftermath of another calamity: a multiyear economic downturn that has caused widespread unemployment, threatened social stability, and stretched thin the country's safety net. Just as Carmo's ceilingless nave 
Four Terrible Years
In June of 2011, just two months after Portugal's request for an international bailout from the EU-ECB-IMF "troika," the recently elected Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho predicted that the following two years would be "terrible" for the country (Público 2011) . Apparent now is that Passos Coelho was being overly optimistic in making this prediction. His forecast of a "terrible two years" turned into a terrible four years, a verdict echoed by many political commentators. Even with the 2015 defeat of his center-right coalition by a parliamentary left majority, few ways out of the country's disquiet seem to be in sight.
The former prime minister was hardly alone in his misplaced optimism; making buoyant economic predictions that do not become reality has ostensibly become as common in Portugal as football analysis. Whether made by the domestic or international business press, or government or troika officials, pronouncement after pronouncement have turned out to be consistently wrong. Given that the country's commercial and residential properties remain plastered with "for sale" and "to let" signs -especially those not located in the few areas in the country buoyed by tourism -it has become obvious that Passos Coelho's "two terrible years" will instead mark the beginning of an extended period of economic malaise.
The irony of Portugal missing its bailout targets was that Passos Coelho and his first finance minister, Vítor Gaspar, pledged initially to make more structural changes to F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 the economy than those mandated by the troika. Indeed, few of the crisis-ridden peripheral Eurozone countries have kept to the bailout's terms as diligently as has Portugal. However, as the country's economy continues to stagnate -as it has for five of the past seven years -thousands of restaurants, cafés, civil-construction outfits, and retail shops have closed, due in part to a collapse in demand caused by troika-mandated salary and pension reductions, rent, and tax increases and an unemployment rate over ten percent. Scores of small businesses have ceased all operations, shedding thousands of jobs in their wake. These so-called "micro companies," which employ fewer than ten workers, make up 86 percent of all enterprises in Portugal and account for 40 percent of jobs in the private sector (OECD 2013; cited in Wise 2013) . In such conditions, many working-and even middle-class families struggle to get by, afraid to spend and fearful that one or both household income earners will lose their jobs. to Caetano via official channels were rebuffed, the young officers decided that the only way to end the wars in Africa was to offer Portugal a new political model, which they dubbed the "three Ds": democracy, development, and decolonization. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   6 At this point, it is imperative to sketch out why Portugal's revolutionaries were unable to obtain more support for their experiments in popular organization and worker autonomy. While progressive MFA elements and parties on the radical left did win several important victories during PREC -namely in the areas of pensions, prices, wages, labor law, health care, land distribution, and housing -the elite and upper-middle classes, who had long counted on the support and protectionism of the Salazar government, were not challenged en masse in their positions of power within the country's core apparatuses (Morton 2011: 346) .
While the reasons for the eventual ebb in Portugal's revolutionary experiment are many, a central factor points to the extent of foreign influence within the country's political economy. This state of affairs meant that powerful international entities, from large Western European and US banks and industrial groups to the Pentagon and CIA, were keen to scuttle PREC from the outset. Even the factions of the MFA that supported a transition to socialism were reluctant to contest the many foreign economic and military interests in the country. US military and NATO installations in both the Azores and the Lisbon metropolitan area were resolutely off limits, and the PREC-era nationalizations -"irreversible conquests of the working class," according to the constitution -were to mostly skirt the firms in the country representing foreign capital, including those factories producing for Renault, Firestone, and Toyota. In a way similar to the situations in other Southern European countries, Portugal's economy of this period was defined by a significantly higher percentage of foreign capital than in the nations of Europe's core (Anderson 1962: 102; Poulantzas 1976: 47) . These two limitations, characteristic of Portugal's dependence on capital and materiel from Western Europe and the US, Salazar's ruthless and hated secret police force -and sacking the most visible collaborationists in the media (through a process of saneamento, or purging), a fragmented left could not break up the remaining institutions that had long supported the dictatorship and the national oligopolies, including the gendarmes of the GNR and the PSP security police (Blackburn 1974: 12) .
These partisan fractures on the left, in turn, enabled forces from the center-left to the Christian democratic right to take control of the democratization process and initiate the subsequent turn towards "Europe" and its institutions. In fact, this latter promise of joining the European community seemed to resonate most strongly with Portuguese voters of the era, a sentiment reflected in the Socialist campaign poster for the 1976 parliamentary elections: "Europe, with Us." As seen in the other democratic transitions in Southern Europe, enticing the electorate with an opportunity to join the European institutions was an implicit strategy used by political elites (such as the PS's Mário Soares) to ensure the centrality of liberal democracy and capitalism in post-revolutionary Portugal. From the point of view of Portuguese elites, it was imperative to enshrine these two parameters quickly such that any challenge from the far-left or the militant working classes could be deflected by a system amenable to bourgeois interests.
Lines of communication between the three mainstream parties and the European institutions date from as early as 1974. The European Commission (EC) of François-Xavier Ortoli provided revolutionary Portugal with limited economic assistance, but was only willing to begin negotiations for membership once safeguards for liberal democracy and capitalism were instituted (Gallagher 1979: 213) . In 1976, Mário Soares, the first elected prime minister in the post-dictatorship era, steered Portugal to membership in the figure 2 ).
Tellingly, the prospect of joining "Europe" obliged the Portuguese authorities to temper and reverse many of the remaining measures dating from the PREC period. Responding to foreign pressure, those responsible for amending the constitution in the 1980s sought to remove the more radical of its clauses, such as the government's ostensible commitment to collective models of agrarian reform. The most notable hurdle preventing a swift conclusion of entry negotiations, however, was the legacy of the PREC-era nationalizations of assets in important economic sectors. 
Europe, with Us?
Portugal became an EEC member during a time that this bloc of nations was undergoing a significant phase of integration. In 1986, the Single European Act was passed as the first revision to the Treaty of Rome in 30 years -followed in 1992 by the capital-friendly Maastricht Treaty, which called for the elimination of capital controls and the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB). Among Portugal's political and business elites, however, these developments were met with a degree of anxiety (Soares 2008: 463) . Would Portugal's peripheral economy be able to meet the demands of liberalization at the same time that the government was ceding its sovereignty on monetary, budget, investment, and trade policies? That foreign goods and services would now be allowed greater access to Portugal's domestic market, traditionally more protected than those of its counterparts in the EEC core, meant that the country would be subject to unprecedented competitive pressures. In an attempt to mitigate these potential pitfalls, Cavaco Silva was able to secure a number of transfers of structural funds so that Portugal, in theory, would be better able to face the consequences of a liberalized European Single Market. The largest and most crucial of these initiatives was the Delors I Package of 1988. The considerable financial compensation of this act not only initiated a number of highly visible public-works projects, but also helped to further change the public's perception of "Europe" for the better. In the second half of the 1990s, EU structural funding amounted to 3.3 percent of GDP, leaving an undeniable mark in the country in the form of bridges, highways, and other infrastructure projects (Finn 2017: 15) . As if to assuage the unease that Portugal would not be capable of meeting the challenges of EEC membership, these massive transfers of funds made manifestly clear the advantages of the country's integration into the European community (Soares 2007: 69-83) .
As a result of liberalization measures and EEC (and later EU) adjustment funding,
Portugal became an economic darling of Europe in the late 1980s, boasting low levels of unemployment and multiple years of GDP growth over four percent. Similar to previous booms during the Salazar years, a key driver for this growth was foreign direct investment into "light" manufacturing sectors -such as textiles, clothing, shoes, furniture, paper products, and food and beverages. This investment was again attracted to Portugal because of the country's newfound political stability and low labor costs in comparison to the rest of Western Europe (Baer and Leite 1992: 5 ).
An additional reason for the late-1980s expansion was sustained growth in the markets for commercial, retail, and financial services; these activities, however, corresponded to a marked rise in the levels of consumption and indebtedness of , 1972 Joining this new monetary union brought with it a series of immediate advantages to Portugal. Central in this regard was stability and credibility for Portuguese state and private-sector borrowers, a standing premised on the country's membership within a major international currency zone. Interest rates dropped precipitously, which meant that the Portuguese no longer faced the punitively high rates that had prevailed in the past:
down from 16 percent in the 1990s to around four percent in 2000s (Corkhill 2014: 43-8 ; The first warning signs, however, did not take long to appear. As credit flowed into the country, the borrowing levels of municipalities, businesses, and households increased dramatically, as did their debt levels. Thus, Portugal quickly became awash in borrowed money, a contemporary financialized version of the eighteenth-century
Portuguese frigates that would return regularly from colonial Brazil laden with plundered gold. To quote Reis: in "the mid-1990s, Portugal's net foreign debt was close to zero. Flush with this lent money secured from international financial markets, the Portuguese bought foreign goods and services in ever-increasing amounts, notably from its new EMU confrère Germany. In simple terms, German banks lent to Portugal so that Portugal could buy German exports; while Portugal borrowed and bought, Germany lent and sold. Trouble arose when Portuguese authorities realized that the country's central bank no longer possessed the monetary tools that it had used formerly to manage such disparities (Ferreira do Amaral 2006: 125-7). In the days of the escudo and the mark, any imbalance of payments would have resulted in an exchange-rate adjustment; the Portuguese currency would decrease in value, while the rates at which the country borrowed would rise. What was obvious, however, even in the early years of the Eurozone, was that the asymmetries between Portugal and Germany -countries with vastly different political economies, yet the same currency -were becoming increasingly exacerbated, rather than converging as the euro's promoters had hoped (Watkins 2013) .
By the mid-2000s, the harsh realities of joining the single currency began to manifest themselves. Gone was the headiness of the early 1990s, when Portugal appeared to be catching up economically to its more affluent Northern European partners. What came instead was an extended period of anemic GDP growth -which averaged a mere 19, 1995 For the managers of big capital, when compared to Portugal, the new locales provided numerous advantages to companies seeking to relocate their manufacturing witness to a new phase of deindustrialization, this "Europeanized" Portugal all but ensured that the price to be paid at a time of crisis would be high.
Crisis and Austerity
Even as recent pro-austerity discourses make it seem otherwise, the Portuguese government was until 2010 never short of lenders willing to finance its spending. While creditors at one point lent money to Portugal at similar rates as they did to Germany, come late 2010, this inexpensive and readily available financing had evaporated -at which point the Portuguese found themselves stuck with an unaffordable currency and seemingly unpayable debts, in euros, to large non-resident investors. In the formulation appeared to have borrowed in a domestic currency at very low interest rates, it is as if they had in fact borrowed in a foreign currency over which they had no control" (2016:
494). As early as the autumn of 2008, the global financial crisis originating in US realestate markets had begun to aggravate Portugal's teetering economic situation. In the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, foreign money became more and more difficult Unlike the situations facing Ireland and Spain, there was far less real-estate speculation in Portugal and little property "bubble" to burst. In contrast to Greece, levels of tax evasion and sovereign debt were never as dramatic, and highly centralized Portugal has few of the regional cleavages that make governing so difficult in Spain. What makes the Portuguese case different is that Portugal -unlike its Irish, Spanish, and Greek counterparts -did not experience a period of sustained growth, increases in worker productivity, or financial euphoria in the years leading up to the global crash (Reis 2013: 150) . Neither were there any of the booms in the IT, construction, and tourism sectors as seen in Ireland, Spain, and Greece during the 2000s. In Portugal, financial turbulenceespecially during 2010 and 2011 -thus merely hastened an economic decline that was all At this time, as if tensions within the Eurozone were not obvious enough, the contradictions between the economies of its core and periphery had become particularly stark. In Germany during the first half of the 2000s, internal devaluations of labor costs and measures to ensure wage stagnation -dubbed necessary labor-market "reform" by the business press -allowed Berlin to run increasingly large budget surpluses, which in turn exacerbated the account deficits of countries on the Eurozone periphery (Anderson 2009: 11-12) . Thus, without significant increases to wages and consumption in Germany and elsewhere in the Eurozone core, countries such as Portugal continue to suffer problems of "competitiveness," whose only "acceptable" recourse to date has been excessively stiff austerity measures and harsh cuts to wages and pensions (de Freitas 2017: 427) . Of course, such measures stifle macroeconomic growth and perversely have caused overall debt levels to rise significantly, as has been the case in the three Eurozone countries that have accepted "rescue packages" from the troika.
Yet again, these difficulties were magnified by the seeming lack of alternatives (pace Mrs. Thatcher). At the EU level, consensus among member states in support of a coordinated response was noticeably absent, as the Eurozone did not possess the mechanisms necessary to manage the political and economic integration that should come with monetary integration, particularly during moments of crisis. Furthermore, in a way that few could have imagined in the late 1990s, when Portugal signed on as co-founder of the Eurozone, the common currency had instead become one of the most divisive forces in Europe at the end of the 2000s (Delanty 2014: 213) . What began as a bold experiment the business press, Portugal's bailout was something more akin to a pair of concrete shoes. The government was now forced to implement a litany of troika "crisis management" measures, similar to those imposed on Greece and Ireland: a "six pack" of severe macroeconomic policies, the "Euro Plus Pact," the "Fiscal Compact," the Orwellian-inflected "European Semester," and so on (Watkins 2014: 15) .
Couched in Brussels' neoliberal legalese, these measures embraced an overarching objective, namely to provoke "structural adjustment" by combining cuts in wages with efforts to defund public services. In terms of reducing costs, the troika's In the face of a debilitating crisis, a punishing program of austerity and repeatedly fanciful forecasts by the troika as to the depth and duration of the downturn, it seemed probable that many of the austerity measures in Portugal would signal permanent retrenchment. The combination of substantial cuts in benefits, direct and indirect tax increases, waves of bankruptcies, and mass job losses have resulted in steadily rising hardship among large sections of the working and middle classes, many of whom now fall into the ranks of the "new poor" (Petmesidou and Guillén 2014: 302) . The impact of these developments has been immense; in many families, grandparents with pensions have become the sole means of support to their grandchildren and unemployed sons and daughters. Just as alarming are the rising levels of child poverty and socio-economic inequality, which have increased in an unprecedentedly upward trend (Wise 2013) . As a result of this fragile economic situation, Portugal's social safety net is under considerable stress, which has been the cause for much alarm among the country's religious organizations, charities, leftist parties, and two large trade-union confederations.
From Division to Rapprochement
Until recently, Portugal's system of alternating center-left and center-right 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   24 economic stagnation, and deep cuts to public spending, the ritual of ousting an incumbent government has in Portugal -as it has in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, and Ireland -served as an outlet for the profound discontent harbored by voters. Akin to elsewhere in Europe, however, this process in Portugal looked to have reached an impasse in the run up to the 2015 legislative election. The two largest parties in the country -the center-left Socialists (PS) and the center-right Social Democrats (PSD) -have signed the troika's "memorandum of understanding," thus making their economic programs more alike than different. As a result, it was obvious that PS and PSD would offer voters little choice beyond who is to fill the suit representing Portugal as it stands pleadingly before its international creditors.
Nowhere was this malaise more apparent than in the immediate outcome of the October 2015 legislative elections. Despite the years of punishing austerity, the ruling center-right PSD/CDS-PP coalition -christened "Portugal Ahead" -came in first with 39 percent of the ballots cast, even as the two parties lost their combined absolute majority in parliament. Initially, the right-leaning national and international press hailed the coalition's "victory" as a vote of confidence for the continuation of austerity, or "fiscal consolidation" as its proponents refer to it. "The overwhelming opinion in the past two years was that the government would lose because you could not win with austerity measures," Miguel Poiares Maduro, a PSD minister, told the New York Times. "But I think we've now allowed people to see that their sacrifices made sense. I think the Portuguese people have understood that austerity was not a choice, but a necessity that we had to go through" (cited in Minder 2015) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The fervor with which Ferreira Borges and others denounced the president's posturing makes it seem as if such anti-democratic moves were rare in contemporary Portugal. Hardly. In fact, one can detect a logic to these maneuvers, given the frequency with which they occur. Take, for example, the 2016 state budget, the first to be proposed by the PS-led government. This included several measures considered sensible and long overdue for a country that still has not recovered its pre-crisis level of economic activity: As the summer of 2016 approached, further confrontations between the PS-led government and the EU seemed inevitable. Once again, Portugal found itself in the crosshairs of the European Commission -this time, for its annual public deficit of greater than 3 percent (see figure 9 ). In light of Portugal's continued "non-compliance" with the figure 9 ). While the above achievements have hardly amounted to a sweeping transformation of Portuguese society, they have nevertheless alleviated some of the hardship experienced by the country's beleaguered middle and working classes from the multiple years of austerity. , 1995 -2016 
Portugal in Ruins
Some seven years after Portugal received a "rescue" at the hands of international creditors, more than a third of the country's youth are still without work, and debt levels goods, and high levels of debt, it is hard to see how the country will be able to avoid some kind of default in the future -an opinion shared by none other than the late Mário
Soares, who has previously advocated an "Argentine solution" for its financial obligations (Evans-Pritchard 2013). A more realistic way forward might instead be to formulate a structured "haircut" for Portugal's debt load, though even this modest proposal is unlikely. Among the country's political class, any mention of making the largely foreign lenders bear some responsibility for the loans extended to the national and local governments remains taboo. No Portuguese politician from the three mainstream parties (PS, PSD, and CDS-PP) has spoken seriously of debt forgiveness, for fear of scaring "the markets." Instead, the EU, ECB, and IMF lend their collective institutional weight to ensuring that the Portuguese government repays its creditors in full with interest, no matter how much human suffering occurs in the meantime (Ferreira do Amaral and Louçã 2014). Another potential remedial measure that could temporarily assuage Portugal's troubles would be the creation of "Eurobonds," that is, a supra-state mechanism to equalize the borrowing requirements among all Eurozone countries -both the "lender" nations of Northern Europe and their "borrowing" counterparts in the South.
Given the current resistance to Eurobonds among German and Dutch voters and within their countries' ministries of finance, such a proposal would not be politically possible, however rational it may be.
And so continues the political maneuvering, and its attendant crises, bringing little succor to the Portuguese public. The rebuilding of Lisbon after the 1755 earthquake commenced only after the Marquis of Pombal, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, took about organizing relief and rehabilitation efforts. Firefighters were sent to extinguish the post-earthquake infernos, and scores of workers and ordinary citizens were compelled to dispose of the thousands of corpses to ensure that disease would not spread. To prevent disorder amid the ruins, Pombal deployed the army to prevent able-bodied lisboetas from fleeing the clean-up efforts and sentenced suspected looters to public execution on the gallows.
Pombal did not just take control of the post-earthquake crisis; he also transformed how Lisbon was rebuilt in its aftermath. A little more than a month following the catastrophe, royal engineer Manuel da Maia presented his reconstruction plans for the city to Pombal and the king. Several options were put forward, from widening particular roads to rebuilding the city from the very rubble caused by the earthquake. Da Maia concluded his list by proposing that the entire Baixa neighborhood be razed and that its rebuilding -save the Carmo Covent -should proceed according to a "new plan of boldly designed streets" (França 1989: 18) . This daring final option was the one eventually chosen by Pombal and King José I.
Perhaps human-created calamities, such as the one that continues to afflict
Portugal and the other countries of the Eurozone periphery, are ultimately more difficult to transcend than those caused by freak natural disasters that take place in eighteenthcentury absolute monarchies. These crises are undoubtedly more difficult to comprehend, and there is always more than enough confusion around to shield those responsible from having to answer for their actions. What is certain, however, is that few people in
Portugal can at present show the Portuguese any plausible exit from the current malaise. The political class has become structurally incapable of resolving the situation, as it is too focused on domestic political rivalries and the whims of international creditors to address the grave challenges facing the country. Without a reconstruction effort comparable to the one followed by Pombal, it seems as if Portugal will be condemned to a decade or more of high unemployment, sluggish growth, and falling living standards -doomed to remain a minion of German bullying and intransigence. 
